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ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE: A STRATEGY PRIMER




Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is probably the most complex
form of maritime conflict. The search for solutions of the "submarine
menace" tends to be focussed on technological "fixes" - more
powerful and longer-range means of surveillance, faster and more
accurate detection systems, and stand-off, high-probability-of-kill
weapons. Little about the technologies of modern submarine and
anti-submarine warfare is comparable with the methods of history's
first ASW campaign, World War I. By contrast, ASW strategies have
basically remained the same ones that were first tried out more than
70 years ago. It is the purpose of this "primer" to set forth the
fundamental choices of ASW strategies that are the framework for
the exploitation of ASW technologies.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is a form of warfare, fought
mainly at sea, that is aimed at defeating the war-fighting purposes of
the submarine. ASW is practiced at three levels of planning:
strategic, operational, and tactical. Basic ASW strategies are of three
kinds: (1) destruction of the opponent's submarines (2) containment
of enemy submarines, and (3) limitation of the war-fighting
efficiency of the hostile submarine fleet. The operational level of
ASW planning is concerned with where and how to destroy, contain,
or limit the efficiency of hostile submarines. The basic operational
choice is whether to defeat the submarine at (1) its sources , i.e.
operating bases and construction yards, (2) in the transit areas (the
so-called "chokepoints") that the ubmarine must pass through to
and from its sources, or (3) in the patrol areas themselves. ASW
tactics are concerned with the local coordination of platforms,
weapons, and sensors in the area of encounter itself. The tactical
ASW encounter consists of four phases: (1) surveillance and
reconnaissance, (2) detection, (3) tracking, and (4) attack.
Historical Background
ASW emerged as a strategic preoccupation for naval planners
during World War I. Pre-war defensive measures against the
"submarine torpedo-boat" were little more than ad hoc adaptations
of tactical procedures that had been adopted by most fleets to guard
against the other "sneak attack" weapon, the torpedoboat. The
principal offensive measure relied on the warship's superior speed to
run down and ram the underwater opponent; defensive measures
included sailing a "zig-zag" course and, in port, the erection of
physical obstacles (such as harbor booms and blockships, and anti-
torpedo nets), and nighttime illumination.
The pre-1914 failure to anticipate the strategic scope of the
submarine problem can be attributed to the dominant "image" of the
submarine. First, the submarine was expected to seek out "legitime,"
meaning naval targets; few Allied or Entente naval planners on the
eve of World War I foresaw that the submarine would be a
commerce-raiding weapon first and an anti-fleet weapon second.
Furthermore, most naval professionals doubted that the submarine
"auxiliary" would be more than a "nuisance;" between its inferior
speed, limited combat radius, and near-blindness when submerged,
the submarine was expected to limit its wartime contribution to
coastal defense and occasional scouting missions on behalf of the
"real" fleet of battleships and battlecruisers. Six months into the war,
the prognosis of a quick conclusion had collapsed - so had the image
of the submarine as an occasional nuisance. At sea, the pre-war
plans for a "decisive battle" gave way to the search for long-term
ways and means for defeating the most difficult opponent in
recorded Naval history.
ASW Strategies of Destruction
All things equal, the preferred ASW strategy is one that results
in the physical destruction of the submarine -- the outcome is
permanent and, with the underwater opponent eliminated, resources
can be released for other wartime duties. Strategies of destruction
have also proven to be the most difficult and risky; depending on the
quality and quantity of the opposing submarine force, its complete
elimination may take more time and tie up more sources than can be
afforded. A different kind of risk may be associated with "strategic"
ASW against strategic missile submarines. The destruction (or even
the threat of destruction) of this particular type of submarine, claim
some commentators, undermines the stability of mutual strategic
deterrence, and could force a decision to "use-them-instead-of-lose-
them."
Destruction at the Source
The preferred operational strategy of destruction is aimed at
the sources of the submarine menace, i.e. operating bases,
construction, repair and maintenance yards, and industries that
manufacture critical components. The single most important
advantage of this approach is that it circumvents ASW's most
difficult problem: finding the opponent. Unfortunately from the
point of view of the ASW strategist, enemy submarine bases and
building yards also tend to be heavily defended and can therefore
usually only be attacked at great risk to one's own forces. The allied
naval planners of World War I shared President Woodrow Wilson's
"despair of hunting for hornets all over the sea when I know where
the nest is." But very few among them shared Wilson's willingness to
"scarifice half the navy Great Britain and we together have to crush
the nest. . .
"
The practice and planning of destruction at the source has
known four methods: (1) physical seizure and occupation of bases
and yards, (2) fleet bombardment, (3) aerial bombardment, and (4)
mining. For reasons that are obvious, the first method will be the
most decisive one. Yet, for reasons equally obvious, the physical
seizure and occupation of enemy submarine bases and yards is likely
to be attempted and crowned with success only if they are part of a
general campaign of territorial conquest. The Anglo-American and
Soviet occupation, in 1944-45, of the French and Baltic coastal areas,
respectively, deprived the German U-boat fleet of key operating and
construction sources. This outcome was not the result, however, of a
deliberate ASW strategy, but instead the "bonus" reward of the
Allies' general advance.
Excepting the sporadic shelling, by the Royal Navy, of
Germany's U-boat bases on the Belgian coast in World War I, the
strategical choice of destroying the submarine menace at its source
through fleet bombardment has historically been stymied by the fear
of disproportionate losses. Some post-facto commentators have
insisted that
,
had the British Grand Fleet fought the Battle of Jutland
(of 1916) to a "decisive" (and presumably victorious) conclusion,
Germany's main U-boat concentrations in the Heligoland Bight would
"have been "sitting ducks." According to Winston Churchill, "It was
the policy of Jutland which led directly to the supreme submarine
peril of 1917." On balance, however, Churchill's other comment a_
propos the risks and uncertainties facing the commander-on-the
spot, Sir John Jellicoe, was the weightier one; Jellicoe, he wrote, was
"the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon."
The destructive record of mining and aerial bombardment of
submarine bases and yards is a mixed one. During World War I a
single U-boat was lost among the more than 44,000 mines that were
scattered in the Heligoland Bight; altogether 14 U-boats were
destroyed in their Baltic Sea training grounds during World War II.
Arguably, the most productive result of the Baltic mining offensive
was the interference with crew training and new-construction work-
up, i.e. with the U-boats's efficiency . The official British history of
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945 suggests
that the campaign may have prevented 20 Type XXI U-boats from
becoming operational.
Especially disappointing were the results of the World War II
air offensive against the operational and industrial sources of the U-
boat. Principal operational targets were the concrete submarine
shelters on the French and Norwegian coasts. Even the heaviest
bomb of the war, the 12,500-pounds "Tallboy," failed to penetrate
the roofs up to eight meters thick. One U-boat was destroyed at its
base in Trondheim, Norway in July 1943. Post-war tests by the
Americans indicated that a future air assault against "hardened"
submarine pens would probably require nuclear weapons.
Industrial sources for the Allied bombing campaign included
four broad target sets: (1) the U-boat building yards themselves (2)
centers for the manufacture of key components (e.g., the Hagen
center for the construction of batteries) (3) the German industrial
and transportation system generally, and (4) the labor force. The
British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU) report on The Effects of
Strategic Bombing on the Production of German U-Boats concluded
that the bombings directly and indirectly contributed to a production
loss of 111 U-boats. It reported that another 42 operational units
were destroyed in port. The report acknowledged, however, that the
estimated production loss of 30 Type XXIs due to the "indirect" effect
of the bombings was, in effect, an "educated guess." Furthermore,
most of the U-boat production losses caused by the "direct" effect of
bombing occurred in 1945, when no time was left for such boats to
become operational.
The reasons for the low profitability of the anti-source
bombing campaign were these: (1) the inadequacy (mainly in terms
of accuracy) of contemporary bomb-laying techniques (2) the
enemy's better-than-expected recovery capabilities (3) the generally
efficient German air defense system, and (4) the "cyclical" pattern of
the "direct" offensive against U-boat pens, yards, and other facilities.
Destruction in the Transit and Patrol Areas
Because of the difficulty, in fact, of destroying the submarine at
the source, the ASW defender is usually compelled to find ways to
defeat it at sea, including the submarine's transit and operational
patrol areas.
A key determinant for the success of a strategy of destruction
in the transit areas is local geography , i.e. the length, width, and
depth of the "chokepoint." The collective ASW benefit of a long,
narrow, and shallow area of submarine passage is: (1) a high
predictability of the submarine's comings and goings (2) multiple
opportunities for attack, and (3) minimum submarine escape
volume .
The opposite conditions usually exist if the submarine's patrol
area is on the high seas. It follows that an ASW strategy aimed at
finding and destroying the opponent in the open ocean is highly
dependent on strategic intelligence about his general whereabouts,
strength, and direction of movement. Put another way, a hunt-and -
kill (HUK) strategy without the benefit of strategic "cueing" has
historically shown to be a cost-ineffective search for a "needle in the
haystack."
Strategies of destruction in the transit areas have generally
relied on minefields, sometimes backed up by mobile surface and air
patrols that are linked to "bell-ringer" detection devices. A
successful ASW barrier system will destroy few enemy submarines.
After the first few losses, submarines are likely to be diverted to
another and less dangerous route of passage; if this does not exist,
they are effectively contained. The latter was the fate of the
submarines of the Soviet Baltic Fleet during World War II. From the
spring of 1943 until the capitulation of Finland in September 1944,
the German-Finnish "Walross" barrier of steel nets, mines, and
mobile patrols across the Gulf of Finland excluded the Soviet
underwater flotillas from the Baltic Sea.
Destruction strategies in the patrol areas have been practiced
in two basic and one "hybrid" forms. The basic forms are "offensive"
HUK, and "defensive" armed escort of the targets of the submarine,
i.e. the convoy system . Between the two falls the system of
"
protected lanes " or defense of the so-called " focal points " of friendly
shipping. This last strategy basically proposes to combine intensive
HUK and close escort operations in the approaches to ports and
harbors where seagoing traffic is "funneled," and where enemy
submarines may be expected to concentrate. Although a failure in
the past, some Western naval planners today believe that, between
much improved detection capabilities and a shortage of convoy
escorts, the strategy can and must work.
Today, as in the past, the prospect of a HUK strategy is vitally
dependent on strategic cueing. During World War II, Allied "hunting
groups" achieved spectacular successes thanks to two sources of
"strategic" intelligence: (1) the interception and location of U-boat
radio traffic through high-freguency direction-finding (HD/DF), and
(2) the de-cryption of the U-boat fleet's "Triton" cipher.
Contemporary strategic intelligence about enemy submarime
movements still relies, in part, on communication interception. The
ASW plans of the major powers cannot depend, however, on a repeat
of the Triton-breaking success of World War II's "Ultra" group.
Instead, billions of dollars and rubles have been and are being
invested in extremely long-range acoustic and non-acoustic ocean
floor-mounted and satellite-carried ASW "early warning" systems.
Today still, the convoy system is frequently labeled a
"defensive" ASW strategy and, by connotation, "inferior" to
"offensive" HUK. The record of the two world wars is this: (1) the
convoys were the single most successful means for defeating the
purpose of the U-boat, i.e. sever the Allies' economic and military
arteries, and (2) ships and aircraft on convoy escort duty destroyed
more submarines than did their counterparts that engaged in HUK
operations.
ASW Strategies of Containment
Destruction of the enemy's submarines is a bonus : the essential
purpose of the ASW strategist is to defeat the war-fighting purpose
of his opponent. Containment strategies have historically depended
on physical obstruction of the submarine's movements, including
minefields, nets, and "blocking ships." The creation of the strategic
missile submarine has added the idea of psychological containment
by similar ("countervailing") forces.
The advantage of an ASW strategy of containment is twofold:
(1) it minimizes the risk of casualties that is part and parcel of
destruction strategies, and (2) it reduces the need for current
intelligence about the submarine enemy's plans and movements; in
theory at least, all the ASW defender needs doing is to find the right
"cork" to "bottle up" the opponent. The disadvantage of containment
is also twofold: (1) it is quite difficult to create a hermetically-
sealed barrier, and (2) containment schemes are likely to tie up
forces that are badly needed elsewhere.
Containment at the Source
Most close-in ASW containment schemes have relied on
minefields. Few have proven effective for the same basic strategic
reason that has historically deterred "fleet action" against the sources
of the submarine. Success in mine warfare ultimately depends of the
relative stamina of the two sides, i.e. the relative persistence of the
mine-layer and the mine-clearer . The Allied mine-laying campaigns
of the two world wars failed to contain the U-boats inside their bases
because the Allied navies were unable or unwilling to patrol the
fields within easy reach of enemy counter-attack, and prevent the
Germans from clearing a safe passage through the cordon.
British efforts in World War I to contain the U-boats inside
their bases by sinking blockships failed, in part, for the same reason.
On April 22-23, 1918, a Royal Navy flotilla "practiced" a small-scale
version of Admiral Jellicoe's proposal to close off the U-boats'
Heligoland Bight exits by sinking 83 old warships filled with
concrete. Two blockships were laid athwart the channel to the U-
boat base at Zeebrugge on the Flanders coast. The physical portion
itself of the operation was successful, but, within less the one month,
the U-boats were back-in-business thanks to a channel dug around
the obstruction. The operation, for all its gallantry and ingenuity
could have been no more than a short-lived success as long as the
British fleet was not prepared to guard against enemy efforts to
remove the obstacle.
Containment in the Transit and Patrol Areas
"Static" containment strategies without the presence of mobile
reactive forces have proven equally unproductive in the submarine's
transit and patrol areas. The basic problem is that a determined
submarine opponent is likely to eventually to find means and
methods to find or "create" a crack. The most famous (if not most
successful anti-transit barriers of the two world wars were the Dover
and Northern "barrages." The first one involved a combination of
minefields and "tripwires" laid across the English Channel; the second
depended on tens of thousands of mines planted in the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) "gap." The World War I version of
the Dover Ban-age failed during most of its lifespan due to the British
failure to maintain reactive patrols after daylight hours and the
wintermonths from December through April. Its World War II
variant was circumvented by the German occupation of France. The
Northern Barrage of the "Great War" stretched across the 400
kilometers of water that divide the Orkney Islands from Norway.
Established in the spring of 1918 (when the convoy system had
already proven its effectiveness), the system proved more dangerous
to the Allied mine-laying force than to the U-boats. The tendency of
the mines to explode prematurely was part of the problem; more
important, the Allied patrol ships that were to harass the intruders
and force them into the deep minefields, were withdrawn for other
duties. Four-to-six U-boats were lost on the barrier. A single U-boat
may have fallen victim to World War II's northern barrage; more
Allied ships were lost to mines broken loose from their moorings.
Contemporary barrage schemes combine containment and
destruction tactics, using "smart" mines (such as the American Mk
60 "encapsulated torpedo, " or Captor), mobile or stationary accoustic
"fences," and long-range patrol aircraft. One possibility is to
completely encircle the submarine's suspected patrol area with air-
dropped accoustic buoys, and the methodically shrinking the fenced
area by placing one buoy row inside another until the enemy has
been pinpointed for final prosecution.
Strategies for Limiting the Submarine's War-Fighting Efficiency
If the enemy submarine cannot be destroyed or contained, yet
is denied the full use of its destructive capabilities, the ASW
strategist has achieved his purpose. The choice of efficiency-limiting
strategies begins at home, and is dependent on the war-fighting
purpose of the enemy submarine fleet. For example, if the purpose
is economic strangulation, the ASW defender may counter by
reducing his dependence on seaborne commerce (e.g., food rationing,
boosting domestic sources of supplies). If the threat is one of
strategic missile attack, various passive and active "damage
limitation"measures are possible.
Limiting Efficiency at the Source
One possible method to degrade the submarine's operational
efficiency has alread been mentioned, namely the mining of crew
training areas. Production efficiency may be attacked by aerial
"harassment raids," aimed at forcing yard workers to repeatedly stop
10
work and seek shelter. One of the hoped-for effects of the Allied city
bombings was the lowering of the morale and hence fighting
efficiency of U boat crews.
Limiting Efficiency in the Transit and Patrol Areas
The purpose of efficiency-limiting strategies in the transit or
patrol areas is to minimize the submarine's productive patrol time.
As already noted, the measure of success of a barrier system is not
necessarily the number of submarines destroyed, but may be instead
the extent to which the enemy is forced to seek an alternate and
more time-consuming route. For example, the success of the
"improved" Dover Barrage of 1917-18 lay in the forced re-routing of
the U-boats via the more distant waters between Norway and
Scotland.
A successful means in the past to degrade the submarine's
productivity has been broad area search and surveillance by patrol
aircraft. The tendency of the submarine to avoid an opponent who
could look over-the-horizon was discovered by accident with use of
kite balloons (ship-towed balloons with a human observer) in the
Mediterranean theater in World War I. During World War II, the
fear of airborne discovery forced the U-boats in transit through the
Bay of Biscay to spend increasingly more time at slower underwater
speeds. Similarly, an unquantifiable measure of effectiveness of the
World War II convoy air escorts was the frequency that their mere
presence forced the U-boats to break tactical contact, and look for
easier prey elsewhere.
The submarine's productive period is determined, in part, by
the amount of fuel and weapons it carries. The first consideration is
irrelevant for the nuclear submarine, but the second is still so today.
The implication is that a submarine, nuclear or otherwise, can be
denied its full potential by interfering with its logistics
infrastructure. The best-known illustration of this particular
strategy is the systematic Allied cammpaign of World War II to
11
destroy the "Milch Cows"- the U-boats' fuel replenishment
submarines.
The Foreseeable Future
The choice of ASW strategy is determined by two factors: (1)
the prevailing balance between submarine and anti-submarine
technologies, and (2) the particular war-fighting purposes of the
submarine that need defeating. The foreseeable technological
balance will hinge on (a) the submarine's "stealth" versus ASW
detection capabilities, and (b) the ability of the ASW defender to
attack the submarine quickly and accurately at "stand-off" ranges.
As long as the oceans do not become "translucent," prospects are that
the submarine will continue to evolve and assume tasks that have
traditionally been the prerogative of surface fleets, for example, air
defense of the aircraft carrier. New submarine roles will prompt a
new "menu" of ASW strategies.
The table below compares the destructive productivity of
different ASW methods during the two world wars. Not shown are
submarine losses due to scuttling, collisions and other marine
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